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VII. At end this review of facts, can ask what does destruction of Stalin myth mean for present Soviet regime? As we see it, campaign brings present regime advantages, but also embarrassment and dangers.

A. Some of advantages--

Abroad: Will reduce bad odor of Communism; facilitates winning cooperation of non-Communist left intellectuals in popular fronts; get nationalist leaders behind neutral or pro-USSR policy.

At Home: Will strengthen regime and broaden its base, by encouraging honest competence in upper layers of bureaucracy and reducing fear of police terror.

Both at Home and Abroad: Will provide convenient scapegoat for all past

Soviet iniquities and errors

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B. Advantages, some extent counter-balanced by difficulties inherent for Soviet leaders in iconoclastic course. One problem:

C. Most of these leaders were Stalin's own hatchet-men for many years.

1. Khrushchev held key jobs under Stalin after 1935 (18 years).
2. Bulganin held key jobs under Stalin after 1931 (21 years).
3. Mikoyan held key jobs after 1922 (30 years).
4. Kaganovich held key jobs after 1924 (28 years).
5. Malenkov probably member Stalin's personal Secretariat beginning 1925 (27 years).
6. Molotov close associate of Stalin at least from 1912 (40 years).

D. Another problem: although Soviet leaders are anxious to dissociate themselves from Stalin's reputation for cruelty and violence, they do not intend to relinquish benefits, acquired by Stalin, which they now enjoying.

VIII. Finally, although "Operation Rethink" on Stalin will probably not upset internal security of USSR, it opens king-size Pandora's box of embarrassing questions with which Khrushchev and Company will have to deal:

A. Since Stalin is a dishonored prophet, perhaps all his books (esp. Problems of Leninism) will have to be burned (history of his era, esp. History of the CPSU: Short Course, is already being rewritten).

B. Old associates of Stalin are surely

- C. Stalinist-type Satellite leaders bound to be uneasy: Beirut (Poland) died conveniently; Rakosi (Hungary) is feeling shaky.
- D. Mao Tse-tung now surely replaces Stalin as leading modern Communist theoretician--does this mean that Mao and Lenin are equal greats?
- E. Regime will be under some pressure to indicate which of various Soviet foreign policies were Stalin's and henceforth to be repudiated by "good" collective leadership (Korean war? Berlin blockade? etc.)
- F. Since most of existing international agreements with West (Yalta, Potsdam) were personally Stalin's, what commitments does the USSR now stand by, and what ones does it repudiate?

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G. Communists, as well as intellectuals in the socialist and non-Communist left, will remember and ought to be reminded that Stalin also started out with "collective leaderships"; and as matter of fact ran through several sets of collectives before emerging as undisputed arbiter about

1929. (Stalin-Zinoviev-Kamenev vs. Trotsky 1924-25); (Stalin-Bukharin-Rykov-Tomsky vs. Trotsky-Zinoviev-Kamenev 1925-27); (Stalin-Molotov-Voroshilov-Mikoyan vs. Bukharin-Rykov-Tomsky 1927-29).

H. Regime may be pressed to admit that Stalin murdered Trotsky, and even to restore Trotsky to place of honor with Lenin.

I. Lenin's caustic criticisms of Stalin, warning he was a menace, if printed,

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- J. The Soviet people must wonder how they can tell when they have an "evil dictatorship" and when they have "collective leadership," both of which look much the same from anywhere outside the top circles.
- K. Ethnic Great Russians must wonder if a Ukranian plot to take over Moscow isn't following hard upon the heels of Georgian tyranny.
- L. Some Stalinist behavior since Stalin's death (e.g., Beria's judicial murder) will have to be explained away more adequately than in past.
- M. Task of renaming all the cities (Stalingrad, Stalinabad, etc.), to say nothing of streets (like Berlin's Stalin Allee), could keep Soviet Bureaucracy out of mischief for a long time.

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N. More seriously, Soviet leaders must be afraid some people will think that situation calls for Army takeover, since military is only force relatively untainted by Stalinism.

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